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In the past ten or fifteen years, the areas of philosophy of religion and 
philosophical theology have been among the fastest growing fields within the 
discipline of philosophy. Only a few decades ago, many of the leading philoso-
phers in the world were either openly hostile to religion or else completely in-
different to its concerns. This created a nearly pervasive atmosphere in the 
profession and renewed the long-rumored reputation of philosophers as ene-
mies of faith. But now a new breeze is blowing down the halls of the academy. 
A significant number of the most active and prominent contemporary philoso-
phers are these days devoting their energies to a careful examination, and even 
defense, of many of the traditional tenets of Christian theology. There has 
been a great amount of new and exciting work on the concept of God, on the 
various divine attributes such as omnipotence and omniscience, on the rational 
status of religious belief and on the nature of religious experience. There has 
also recently been a development which is even more fascinating and unex-
pected, given the philosophical climate of previous decades: philosophers have 
begun to show deep interest in the distinctive doctrines of the Christian faith, 
focusing their attention on such ideas as those of incarnation, trinity, atone-
ment, sanctification and the nature of sin. An immediate result of this is that 
we are quickly attaining a new level of conceptual clarity concerning the content 
and credibility of these doctrines. Philosophers, for a long time thought of as 
nothing more than critics of religious thought, arc now to be numbered among 
its champions. At least this is true for a surprising number of contemporary 
thinkers. 
There is no little irony in the fact that this comes at a time when a number 
of respected academic theologians have, purportedly on philosophical grounds, 
largely abandoned the traditional claims dist inctive of the Christian faith 
throughout most of its history. In the writings of some prominent contempo-
rary theologians, the doctrinal foundations of the Church arc labelled as myths, 
reinterpreted as symbols or reassessed as grammatical rules merely intended to 
govern a particular religious " language-game." As straightforward claims about 
the way things are, they seem to be thought of as something of an embarrass-
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ment. This, to put il mildly, is a remarkable turn of affairs. Until fairly recently, 
the existential force of the Christian gospel was understood in the context of a 
Christian story about God, the world and human beings which, as a conjunction 
of claims about the way things are, was believed to be tnte, metaphysically and 
morally correct. Of course, the apostles and the authors of the New Testament 
documents were not viewed as metaphysicians or moral philosophers. But it 
was generally recognized that their message has presuppositions and implica-
tions as well as central components which fall within the province of metaphys-
ics and moral philosophy, and which can be very useful when elucidated in the 
technical terms appropriate to these important domains of human thought. 
This view of the Christian message is now often termed "proposilionalism" 
or "cognitivism" by its theological detractors, and is thought to be a pre-mod-
ern mistake which arose only out of a philosophical innocence now long lost. 
In fact, anyone who thinks otherwise is nowadays quite often said to be naive, 
unsophisticated, a-historical (a charge shortly to be explained) and--nearly eve-
ryone's favorite term of disapprobation now that 'heretic' is unfashionablc--a 
fundamentalist. How is this aversion to the tradition's self-understanding on 
the part of leading academic theologians to be explained? What motivates 
their large scale move away from what they call proposilionalism? What, if 
anything, grounds their charges? In light of the wide divergence between such 
theologians and a great many contemporary philosophers on this issue, it may 
be worthwhile to examine a bit, however briefly, why it is that some theologians 
are now criticizing philosophers for taking the straight forward cognitivism of 
the tradition seriously, as providing the framework for their own efforts. 
A dominant trend in modern theology is to reinterpret the traditional 
Christian doctrines as symbols whose function is merely lo express and evoke 
certain sorts of evaluative and religious attitudes and e>.peric11ces. Representing 
one variant of this trend quite candidly and succinctly, John H ick once re-
marked concerning the central Christian claim that Jesus was, and is, God In-
carnate (lhe claim captured in the classical doctrine of the incarnation), that 
"the real point and value of the incarnational doctrine is not indicative bul ex-
pressive, not to assert a metaphysical facl but to express a valuat ion and evoke 
an attitude."1 
This systematic focus on human altitudes and experiences has become so 
firmly entrenched in modern theology since the work of Schleiermacher as lo 
become a hoary tradition unto itself. In his recent and enormously influential 
book, 771e Nature of Doctrine, George Lindbeck makes some very revealing 
comments aboul lhis " long and very notable experiential tradition" in theology. 
Expressing at one point a very common assessment, he says: 
The origins of this tradition in one sense go back to Kant, for he 
helped clear the ground for its emergence by demolishing the 
metaphysical and epistemological foundations of the earlier regnant 
cognitive-propositional views. T hat ground-clearing was later 
completed for most educated people by scientific developments that 
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increased the difficult ies of accepting literalistic propositional 
interpretations of such biblical doctrines as creation, and by historical 
studies that im plied the time-conditioned relativity of all doctrincs.2 
These statements from Lindbeck are enlightening in a number of ways. 
First of all, there is a conviction expressed here which seems to be wide-
spread among contemporary theologians, the belief that Kant, or Hume, or 
both together , some two centuries ago dealt death blows to natural theology 
and to the sort of classical theistic metaphysics underlying traditional ap-
proaches to revelational theology. In a strange way, these philosophers have 
become the unlikely patron saints of current academic theology, as the popular 
appraisal of their work has shifted the whole theological enterprise into its now 
common non-metaphysical directions. What is particularly interesting about the 
references theologians make to Kant or Hume is that most often we find the 
philosopher merely mentioned, in a somewhat deferential and even slightly ap-
preciative tone, but we rarely, if ever, see an account of precisely which argu-
ments of his are supposed to have accomplished the alleged demolition of cog-
nit ivism, and exactly how they may be supposed to have had that effect. In fact, 
I must confess to never having seen in the writ ings of any contemporary theolo-
gian the exposit ion of a single argument from either Hume or Kant, or any 
other historical figure, for that matter, which comes anywhere near to demol-
ishing, or even irreparably damaging traditional theistic metaphysics, historical 
Christian doctrine or the epistemology of what we might call " theological real-
ism" (the construal of theology as a discipline whose intent is to represent rel i-
gious realities as they, in fact, are). A great number of the foremost contempo-
rary philosophers, who are quite well acquainted with the work of Hume and 
Kant, reject this conclusion common among theologians about what their writ-
ings show concerning traditional religious belicf.3 
T he developments of modern science that Lindbeck alludes to no more 
clearly proscribe a traditionalist understanding of Christian doctrines than do 
the writings of Hume and Kant. His reference, of course, is to scientific devel-
opments since the time of Kant, although he docs not specify the precise devel-
opments he finds to be troublesome. It is unlikely that he has in mind recent 
strides in molecular biology, quantum mechanics or cosmology, although the 
last of these fields has been thought by some to pose challenges to religious 
belief. (Of course, just as many have hailed its details as corroborat ing the an-
cient theistic claims of cosmic design.) But, in any case, Lindbcck's me ntion of 
the biblical doctrine of creation indicates that what he probably means to in-
voke here is modern evolutionary theory. If, however, one draws the simple 
distinction which must be drawn between the biblical doct1i11c of creation and 
the literary representations of creation to be found in, for exam pie, the book of 
Genesis, it is unclear how this development of scientific theorizing is supposed 
to increase the difficulty of construing a sentence like 
(C) Everything in the universe is created by God and depends on him 
for its existence moment to moment 
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as the expression of a proposition which is true. How other scientific develo p-
ments could increase the dif!icully of accepting the rest of Christian doctrine as 
cognitively avai lable propositional truth is even more dif!icult to sec. 
In addition to the spectres o f Hume and Kant and the apparently bullying 
im age of modern science, historical studies arc cited by Lindbeck as contribut-
ing to the downfall of cognitive-propositional views of Christian doctrine. Now, 
there arc many ways in which histo rical studies since the t ime o f Spinoza might 
be thought to have had a negative impact on traditio nal Christian tho ught. 
First, in reference to biblical studies, it might be argued that we have discov-
ered the classical Christian doctrines not to be clearly present within the bibli-
cal corpus. Further, it is sometimes added, they arc not even hinted at in " the 
earliest stra ta" of the core New Testament documents and their so urces. And 
so, the conclusion is drawn, if we are historically sensitive to the earliest roots 
o f the Christian faith, we will recognize the standard Church doct rines to be 
late r accretio ns inessential Lo, and even corrosive o f, the most authentic Chris-
t ian witness. 
I must admit that during my own training in biblical studies before I came 
to phi losophy, I often wondered whether it was the heavy hand o f phi losophical 
presuppositions which, usually unack nowledged, guided the work of biblical 
scholars, in everything from their exegetical and critical efforts Lo their appl ica-
tio n of procedures for dating documents. This is how I suspected it oft en went: 
o theologian o r biblical scholar idcnti!ied in any sense as a Christian wants lo 
recognize in the earliest and foundatio nal beliefs of his own faith community 
metaphysically implausible, cosmologically incongruous or logically absurd 
claims about reality. If, on the basis of some philosophical argument o r, more 
commonly, rumo rs o f such an argument, the b ib lical scholar comes to believe 
that one or anothe r traditional doctrine is deeply flawed in any o f these ways, 
he o r she may well be less inclined to acknowledge in timations o r an ticipatio ns 
of the problematic formulatio n in the authentic sayings o f Jesus or in the earli-
est witness o f the Church. Since there is no purely mechanical procedure for 
textual archeology on complex a ncient documents, there is ample room within 
the parameters o f accepted scholarly practice for such philosophically inspired 
subject ive disinclinations to have their effect. If this, o r anything like this, has 
been an o perative dynamic in the development o f biblical stud ies in the recent 
past, then we clearly have from this quarter no independent historical challenge 
to a classica l conception of Christian faith and doctrine--wc arc merely directed 
back Lo purely philosophical arguments as potential sources of tro uble. What-
ever the merit of th is speculat io n about the possible psychological dynam ics 
behind some recent work in biblical studies, the Christ ian faith has been tradi-
tionally understood lo be rooted in the entirety of its canonical Scriptures, as 
well as in the creeds, confessions and conciliar decrees of the believing commu-
nity. Any Marcio nitc picking and choosing of favorite sources is unacceptable. 
Whether the fi rst Christian to commit fai th to papyrus had a pro positio nally 
oriented, incipiently doctrinal mindset or not, this is a fundamental orienta tion 
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o f Lhe Christian Church Lhroughoul Lhe centuries, and one which cannol be 
abandoned lightly. 
W e may suppose, however, tha t it is not primarily to the do main of histo ri-
cal biblical studies Lhal Lindbeck alludes when he cites b roadly " historical stud-
ies" as implying " the time-conditioned relativit y of a ll doctrines." It is likely 
that he has in mind ra ther something like this: Quite simply, modern histo rical 
research has made us sensitive to the fact that thought forms vary from culture 
to culture, and from one historical period lo ano ther. Religious tho ught forms 
are no exception. They seem Lo be thoroughly conditioned by Lhe times a nd 
places within which they arise. As Lindbeck himself says later in his book: 
The first -order trulh claims o f a re lig ion change insofar as these arise 
fro m thc ... shifting wo rlds Lhat human beings inhabit. What is la kcn lo 
be real ity is in la rge part socially constructed and consequently alte rs 
in the course o f Lime. The universe o f the ancient Near East was very 
diffcrcnl from that of Greek philosophy, and both arc dissimilar from 
the modern cosmos. Inevitably, the Christianized versions of Lhcse 
vario us world pictures arc far from idcntical.4 
The argumcnl that Lindbeck, in effect, goes o n to give is thal since Christian 
claims aboul reality have been made in very diffcrc nl times and places, those 
claims the mselves must be viewed as deeply different; thus, if doct rines arc 
claims about God, the world and human existence, first-order claims about re-
ality, Lhen they have been importantly changing and d iffering over space and 
Lime--thcrc is no single doctrine o f creation, or incarnation or salvat io n, but a 
set of very different time-conditioned cultural expressions of the faiths of differ-
enl Christians. Surely we want a conception of Christian doctrine such that 
there is continuity in it. Thus, we cannot view doctrines as first-order truth 
claims aboul reality. They arc instead, in Lindbcck's view, grammatical mies. 
Or so he argues. But what of " the time-conditio ned relati1•ity of a ll doctrines" 
Lhal historical studies arc supposed to unveil for the cognitive-propositional 
view of doctrine? Whal is relative to whal? Pe rhaps Lindbeck means Lo suggest 
Lhat since re lig ious claims are, on his concept ion, functio ns of socia lly con-
structed wo rld-views, the truth o f such claims can be understood only as intra-
systcmic truth, or truth-rcla tivc-to-thc-opcrativc-worldview. But the mere exis-
tence of different conceptual schemes does no t a lone entai l tbe semantic re la-
tivity of claims made within those schemes, any more than the existence o f dif-
fering theories in some domain o f scientific inquiry alo ne entails scientific a nti-
rcalism. An argument is needed. And no argument is fort hcoming whose con-
tours arc easily discernible and which might have any chance al a ll of cont ribut-
ing in a forceful way to dispatching the cognitive-p ropositional conceptio n of 
Christian doctrine. What is a t work here is one particular, philosophically 
loaded, sociology o f knowledge, or perhaps bette r, of belief, which seems 
strangely attractive to many contempo rary theologians. But for such a view 
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there is no compelling argument or independent purchase on truth, aside from 
a stipulativc truth-within-its-own-conceptual-framework which we arc free to 
ignore. 
Of course, Platonistic and Aristotelian metaphysics and moral theory were 
presumably unavailable to the great majority, if not a ll, of the biblical authors. 
It does not follow at all from this that their own perspectives and claims cannot 
be captured and unfolded in such philosophically a ttuned thought forms. The 
development of doctrine which ensued from appropriating such thought forms 
is something quite different from, and much more deeply continuous than, a 
mere succession of distinct, time-conditioned linguistic artifacts. We can 
understand the medievals, the patristics and the biblical authors about as well 
as we can understand each other. And we can disagree with them. We arc not 
limited to just noting that what is true-in-our-framework sometim es differs 
from what is true-in-their-framework, and to admitting that the very existence 
of such a difference is itself a fact only in-our-framework. We can really en-
gage the past. Nothing within the purview of modern historical studies has 
shown otherwise. Thus, again, from this direction there is not, after a ll, any 
decisive obstacle to working within the traditional understanding of Christian 
faith and doctrine. 
The mere existence of ongoing doctrinal disputes through the history of the 
Church, and the existence of metaphysical disputes related to these doctrinal 
controversies, seems to be deeply troubling to many modern theologians. Or, 
more spccilically, the fact that there is no humanly ava ilable Archimidean point 
from which to resolve such disputes, no single, simple decision procedure for 
adjudicat ing r ival doctrinal positions, seems to have been a cause for dismay 
among recent theologians contemplating the history of Christian thought. I be-
lieve that it is concern over such matters which has served as a powerful mo ti-
vation in recent years for the move toward theological anti-realism, or at least 
toward the attempt lo develop a practically metaphysics-free form of theologi-
cal reflection. And yet, a ll too o ften, the resulting reflection has not been free 
of metaphysics at all, but rather has been constrained by a naturalistic or mate-
ria list metaphysics alien to the gospel and the whole body of traditional Chris-
tian thought. If Christian thinkers do not, as part of their theological work, 
seek to develop and reline suitable philosophical too ls for the expression of 
their faith, they inevitably just inherit their philosophical assumptions and dis-
positions from the culture around them. Herc is a modicum of truth behind 
one of Lindbeck's convictions no ted above. And, as I think Lindbeck, on reflec-
tion, would agree, not all such cultural legacies are equally suitable to the ex-
pression of Christian faith. 
The lack of a simple algorithm for resolving doctrinal, or metaphysical, dif-
ferences does not prevent rational adjudication of such differences. It just 
makes it much more diflicult. Nor, as most cpistcmologists agree, does the un-
availability of such a procedure in many other departments of human thought 
prevent the attainment of genuine propositional knowledge in these spheres. It 
has often been said that a little philosophy is a dangerous thing. I suspect that 
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one reason for the significant divergence of assum ptions between numerous 
contemporary academic theologians and the professional philosophers now 
doing Christian philosophical theology is that the theologians have had a dan-
gerous amount of philosophy in the course of their theological training. They 
have had enough lo sec problems in the t radition, but not enough to equip 
them to work carefully th rough those problems. 
It is not the conviction of the philosophers now working on these topics 
that t raditional lheologizing is without any serious naws. The contrary convic-
tion on the part of many will become clear in reading their recent publications.5 
The shared assumption is rather that the tradition has substantive commit-
ments well worth exploring and relining, resources which merit detailed philo-
sophical scrutiny and contemporary reappropriation. Whatever Oaws there arc 
should be brought to light as clearly and precisely as possible, so that we might 
seek lo eliminate them and do our part to capture anew the deep truths hereto-
fore imper fectly expressed. 
O ne would have thought that in the years since Lindbeck's book was writ-
ten, or at least in the five years since it was published, the proof of the pudding 
here would have been had in the tasting. A great deal of successful, illuminat-
ing work has been done during this time in precisely the direction deemed by 
Lindbeck to be a dead-end. But, unfortunately, it seems that many theologians 
have not been keen to follow these developm ents, to see where, in fact, they 
might lead. Thus we find in a quite recent essay by a prominent theologian, the 
repeated insistence that the whole framework of contemporary philosophy of 
religion is faulty. In "Evidcntialism: A Theologian's Response," Gordon 
Kaufman argues that current philosophical attention to religion errs from the 
start by adopting three basic presuppositions shared by t raditional Christian 
theological thought.6 These three basic assumpt ions o r presuppositions provide 
the focus, agenda and methods of current philosophical theology, as done by 
philosophers. And they are assumptions which Kaufman believes have been 
undermined altogethe r, rendered intellectually unacceptable, by three corre-
sponding modern developments. It is .remarkable to sec the degree to which 
Kaufman just repeats some of the same worries voiced by Lindbeck, but in a 
slightly different and interest ing packaging which is worth our attention. 
The first assumption or presupposition identified by Kaufman, we can call 
" Religious Proposit ionalism." This is simply the assumption that certain crucial 
propositions actually believed o r adhered to by religious people can be found 
beneath, or distilled out of, the complex of religious pract ice, as themselves 
proper objects, and the primary objects, of philosophical allention. A proposi-
tion is, by definition, a claim or assertion, the content of a declarative or indica-
tive sentence, a truth bearer o r, more cautiously, the sort of thing which can be 
said to be true or false, which can be believed, doubted or denied. The as-
sumption of Religious Propositionalism, when brought to an examination of 
Christ ianity, leads to an identification of certain crucial propositions as believed 
by Christians, and treats these propositions as such that belief that they arc true 
is partly constitutive of what it is to be a Christian. Familiar examples of such 
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propositions would of course be the traditional claims that there is a God, that 
Jesus is God incarnate, that God is a Divine Trinity and thnl hum an salvation 
consists in being properly related lo God through Christ. It has been the prac-
tice of contemporary philosophers, when turning their attention to the Chris-
tian religion, to focus their efforts of analysis and evaluation on these and other 
propositions commonly thought of as central lo Christianity. 
Kaufman believes that Religious Propositionalism ignores the complex dy-
namic function of religious conceptions, symbols and utterances. IL is his con-
tention that the modern understanding of human religious pluralism brings this 
to our attention. According to Kaufman, when we come to an intimate knowl-
edge of the various, disparate human religious tradit ions, we find that what ini-
tially seem to be very different symbols, concepts and propositions arc actually 
items which serve the same practical functions in each of the different religions. 
H indu utterances and Christian utterances, sentences spoken in a religious con-
text by the Hopi, or by a Buddhist, may appear lo serve lo convey very different 
claims about reality. But Kaufman urges us to view this appearance as decep-
tive. Or so, at least, it seems that this is his point. In the holistic approach 
meant to be taken to religion and religious utterances instead of Religious Pro-
posit ionalism, Kaufman urges that ph ilosophers join his new breed of theolo-
gian in focusing more on the simibritics among religions in their practical fun c-
tions rather than on the awkward dissimilarities among them in their apparent 
claims about reali ty. 
But it is not easy lo gel clear on exactly what Kaufman finds unaccept able 
in Religious Propositionalism. Is it that he thinks that Christian propositions 
about God and humankind have fared poorly in the realm of scientific confi r-
mation and so wants to take some approach other than a propositional one lo 
the Christian faith? Or docs he endorse a radical semant ic thesis that from 
first-order religious activities discn:le assessable propositions conceptually can-
not be extracted? Sometimes it seems that he is motivated by the former con-
sideration, sometimes the latte r. But it really doesn't matter since either rea-
son is equa lly controversial. Unless we do att ribute discernible, discrete reli-
gious beliefs to religious people, their religious behavior becomes totally 
opaque and unintelligible. Moreover, it isn't even a question, finally, of 
whether we as observers can abstract propositional attitudes, for example belief 
states, and thus propositions, as the objects of those attitudes--rcligious people 
repon having such beliefs. And those of us engaged in the study of religion who 
arc for t unatc enough lo be insiders with respect to our object of study, know 
fi rst hand that certain propositions arc crucial to Christian faith, as it was deliv-
ered lo us, and as we maintain it. Any semantic theory which is al odds with 
such a plain fact has little to be said for it. And as for the worry that purported 
theological propositions do not fa re well in our hard-headed day of empirical 
inqui ry and scientific confirmation, recent philosophy of religion engaged in 
doing wh:it Kaufman dislikes seems to be demonstrating qu ite the contrary 
Vl e W. 
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The second presupposition of recent philosophical work on religion re-
jected by Kaufman is what we have already referred to as "Theological Real-
ism." This is the assumption, simply, that the propositions extracted from reli-
gious belief have as their intent objective truth. Or, lo pul it another way, it is 
the assumption that those religious people making declarative utterances about 
God (and so forth) intend by doing so to express objective 1ru1hs about the way 
things really are. H aving made this assumption, philosophers then go on to lest 
religions by evaluating the purported truths or systems of purported truths they 
appear lo contain. 
Just as Kaufman seems lo think of Religious Propositionalism as semanti-
cally naive, he judges Theological Realism to be epistemologically naive. He, 
like Lindbeck, claims that recent developments in the socio logy of knowledge 
have indicated both the holistic character of human thought and the relativity of 
conceptual fram es, or frameworks. In light of this, he thinks that religions 
should be viewed i11stmme11tally, not cognitively as a ttempts to articulate and 
embrace tmths. Religion, from his perspective, functions rather " ... to present a 
framework from within which basic orientation and meaning for the whole of 
human life can be found."7 Kaufman thus accordingly believes that philosophi-
cal priority ought to be given to questions about the motivat ion of religious ut-
terances, their function and their practical consequences, not lo questions 
about their truth. 
But there are al least a couple of serious problems here. Quite apart from 
the philosophical sla t us o f the sociological accounts of knowledge, o r rather, of 
what is otherwise normally thought of as knowledge, there are two difficulties 
in Kaufman's diagnosis and recommendation which seem to me decisive. First, 
if we seek a map to o rient us and guide our movements, we surely want a map 
that is accurate. And a map of propositions, a framework for the orientation of 
hum an life, in order lo be accurate must be composed of truths. Thus, the re is 
no driving a wedge between function here and the concern for truth. 
It is true that, in order to determine what proposition a particular utter-
ance might be expressing, we have to understand something about the function 
of the utterance in its context, but it docs not follow from this a t all that phi-
losophers need to study the details of ritual and re lig ious activity before they 
can expect to have any proper philosophical objects for study. If we arc taking 
mainstream Christian faith at face value and no t trying to be ultra-sophisticated 
about it, it seems fairly straightforward, at least in broad outline, what Christi-
anity proclaims, and thus what Christians believe. And these objects of procla-
mation and belief are interesting and proper object s o f philosophical inquiry in 
their own right. Kaufman's insistence to the contrary is unpersuasive. 
The third framework assumption or basic presupposition of contemporary 
philosophy of religion that Kaufman rejects we can call "Conceptual Tradition-
alism." This is, roughly speaking, the assumption that major religious concepts, 
as they have developed over the centuries and have been handed down lo us, 
have a certain integrity and have at least a dcfeasible privileged status as lit ob-
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jects o f philosophical a ttention. Concerning what he refers to as " this symbol 
'God '," Kaufman says: 
We cannot take it for granted that this symbol has always meant the 
same thing; nor can we assume that the meaning it carried in earlier 
periods of history (whether biblical, o r the high Middle Ages, or the 
Reformation) is the meaning which it should (or can) carry for us 
today.8 
The intellectual development that Kaufman thinks has caused us to question 
this assumption is, he says, our awareness that many of the problems of the 
twentieth century, from the Holocaust lo our current ecological t roubles, arc 
somehow results of a mindset produced by traditional Christian theology and 
its many conceptions of God, man and nature forged in former centuries under 
very different cultural conditions. 
This is to me the most astonishing part of Kaufman's essay. The enormity 
of his accusations along with the utter paucity of his evidence for such connec-
tions is one thing. But the philosophical relevance of the a lleged connections is 
utterly mysterious. Even if one person or fifty million people are emotionally 
and attitudinally such that their handling of a concept o r a claim leads to disas-
trous consequences, that has absolutely nothing to do with whether the concept 
in itself is coherent or philosophically interesting and whether the claim is true. 
The psychological questions and sociological questions can be raised, but they 
serve in no way to undermine the properly philosophical questions of meaning, 
coherence and truth. To suggest otherwise without argument is utterly implau-
sible, quite apart from the merit o r demerit of the allegations about causal con-
nections between traditional theology and contemporary disaster. 
In Kaufman's essay, as in Lindbeck's book, we find the strong conviction 
that what contemporary philosophers of religion are up to is wrong-headed, 
out-moded, uninteresting and futile. What we do not find are any strong argu-
ments to back up this convict ion. We do, however, find the expression of a set 
of opinions all too common nowadays among o therwise astute and judicious 
scho lars in departments of thcolot,ry and divinity schools. IL is my hope that we 
contemporary philosophers o f religion can convince our dubious co lleagues to 
cease doing obeisance to Hume and Kant, to throw aside the needless self-im-
posed shackles of groundless materialism and self-defeating relativism, and to 
jo in us as companions in exploring the vast inte llectual riches which fill our tra-
dition. 
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